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of the venture capitalist. A novel result emerges: venture capital also finances firms with 
multiple banking relationships. In the presence of multiple lending, banks could have greater 
difficulty monitoring firms with asymmetric information; moreover, if firms default, banks 
are likely to have a weaker bargaining position. In these cases, the amount of bank credit is 
probably near its limit and firms need to resort to venture capital, a contract that reduces the 
amount of guarantees needed to access external finance.  
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1  
A  large  body  of  literature  has  analyzed  the  relevance  of  financial  factors  for  firm 
growth  (see  Levine,  2004,  for  a  survey).  The  empirical  evidence  has  shown  that  where 
financial systems are more developed, firms more dependent on external finance grow at a 
faster pace than in countries with less developed financial systems (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). 
A related issue concerns the role played by different intermediaries in financing small 
firms and/or young entrepreneurs investing in projects with high technological or innovative 
contents. Small and young firms, lacking a long track record, are usually more difficult for 
external investors to evaluate and therefore may face financial constraints. Active monitoring 
by banks can prompt the release of information on small and young firms and soften these 
constraints. However, if the firm does not have a sufficient amount of collateral to pledge 
against bank debt or if it engages in projects that are too risky in relation to the amount of 
guarantees, bank finance may not be viable.
2 
Young and small firms in high tech sectors are more likely to invest in riskier projects 
and to lack the amount of real assets needed as collateral by banks. Venture capital can help 
solve the financial problems faced by these firms. Indeed, this form of financing has been 
very successful in the United States and has spurred the growth of many high technology 
firms. Venture capital (VC) contracts share some features with debt contracts and some with 
equity contracts. The venture capitalist holds a stake in the firm, but his control rights are 
proportionately  greater  when  the  entrepreneur  must  be  induced  to  put  more  effort  into 
ensuring the success of the project. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) refer to this feature as a 
                                                                 
1   We wish to thank Paolo Angelini, Luigi Cannari, Eugenio Gaiotti, Giorgio Gobbi, Giuseppe Grande, Francesca Lotti, 
Fabio Panetta, Carmelo Salleo, Daniele Terlizzese, Roberto Violi, Ignazio Visco and two anonymous referees for very 
useful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. We are also very grateful to Roberto Del Giudice of the Italian 
Venture Capital Association (AIFI) for providing us with a large part of the information needed for the analysis and for 
his comments. All errors remain ours. The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ and cannot be attributed to 
the Bank of Italy. E mail: andrea.generale@bancaditalia.it. 
2  In fact, one of the features of bank contracts is the demand for “hard assets” from the entrepreneur as protection against 
firm default and to ensure that the entrepreneur is committed to the success of the project. See Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) and Hart (1995).   8 
separation between control and cash flow rights. Control rights allow the venture capitalist to 
participate to the main decisions of the entrepreneur.
3  
The empirical evidence for the United States indicates that venture capital financing is 
mainly directed at small firms operating in high tech sectors and that the performance of 
venture backed firms is significantly different from that of similar firms that did not receive 
this form of financing. Differences in performance pertain to many aspects, such as R&D 
intensity, firm sales growth, and investment, which have been found to be generally higher 
for venture backed firms than for others. 
In the 1990s venture capital and private equity financing developed rapidly not only in 
the United States, but also in the major European countries (Table 1). Important differences 
with respect to the United States relate to the size of the market, which is much larger in the 
United States, the composition of investment – much more tilted towards start up and high 
tech firms in the United States – and the composition of VC resources
4 – with a much larger 
share coming from pension funds in the United States and the main contribution coming 
                                                                 
3  The  main  features  of  the  VC  contract  are  the  following.  Financing  occurs  in  stages,  with  the  ensuing  rounds  of 
financing made conditional on firm performance. For a given financing need, the number of rounds is higher, the 
greater  the  risk  of  the  project  (Gompers,  1995;  Gompers  and  Lerner,  1999).  Staging  allows  a  certain  amount  of 
collateral  to  be  accumulated,  which  will  back  the  next  rounds  of  investment  (Neher,  1999).  The  other  important 
characteristic  concerns  the  convertibility  clauses  of  VC  contracts  (Gompers,  1999).  VC  financing  occurs  more 
frequently in the form of convertible preferred stock. As Sahlman (1990) notes: “Using a convertible preferred [stock] 
also provides flexibility in setting the conversion terms. […] If the company does well, the conversion price might be 
higher, with lower dilution for the management team”  (page 510). Convertibility clauses protect the venture capitalist if 
the project fails, but ensure that the financier enjoys the upside potential of the equity contract and participates in firm 
profits  if  the  project  succeeds  (Berglöf,  1994).  Another  characteristic  of  VC  contracts  is  the  possibility  of  the 
participation of more than one venture capital fund in the investment (syndication), which allows the diversification of 
risk (Lerner, 1994). Other clauses of the VC contract are the possibility to elect board members, to impose non compete 
provisions,  to  obtain  full  control  of  the  firm  if  the  project  badly  under performs.  Moreover,  venture  capital 
representatives in the board of directors often have a power of veto on some important decisions (Gompers and Lerner, 
1996,  and  Hellmann,  1998).  Kaplan  and  Strömberg  (2000)  show  that  the  terms  and  conditions  of  venture  capital 
contracts are fine tuned in relation to the performance of the firm; there is also evidence of a direct involvement in 
decisions relating to executive compensation (see also Gompers and Lerner, 1999). As regards the evidence outside the 
US, Jeng and Wells (2000) report that in the 21 countries examined venture capitalists are frequently less involved in 
the strategic decisions of the firm. In contrast with this evidence, Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2004), using recent 
data from a survey conducted by the European venture capital association, find a growing participation by VC in the 
main decisions of the firm and an increase in their risk tolerance. 
4  Venture capital firms’ resources come from investment funds (usually closed end funds) in which banks, pension funds, 
private investors, and other institutional investors invest.    9 
from banks in Europe. It has been noted that the US venture capital industry has greatly 
benefited both from the large presence of pension funds and from a developed stock market.
5 
Given these differences in the industry characteristics one might also think that the 
determinants and the effects of VC could differ in the European countries compared with 
what  the  empirical  literature  has  shown  for  the  United  States.  In  particular,  since  a 
substantial part of European VC investments has financed large firms, it is likely that other 
factors influence the probability of receiving VC funds over and above the need to obtain 
outside finance for small and risky firms. 
The first aim of our paper is to analyze the characteristics of venture backed firms in 
Italy and to contrast the results with the US experience. By means of a very rich dataset in 
which information on venture capital deals has been matched with balance sheet data for a 
representative sample of venture backed Italian firms, we test whether the indications of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants and effects of venture capital match 
the  Italian  experience.  More  specifically,  the  empirical  exercises  use  probit  regression 
analyses to test the relation between the probability of VC deals and a group of variables 
(such as size, age, level of collateral, etc.) that have been found to be important determinants 
in the United States. The empirical analysis also compares the performance – in terms of 
various balance sheet indicators – of venture backed firms with that of non venture backed 
ones. The ex post analysis of the performance is also useful to discriminate among different 
theories. 
                                                                 
5     On the role of pension funds as providers of funds to the venture capital industry it has been noted (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998) that these institutional investors ensure a stable flow of long term resources to the industry and have a 
longer term approach in judging the returns from VC investments. By contrast, in Europe, the participation of investors 
with a shorter horizon could have determined a preference for investments in larger and more mature firms, usually 
perceived as more profitable and less risky. Moreover, as noted by Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2004), banks “may 
focus their venture activities towards building relationships for their lending activities, rather than developing the early 
stage venture capital itself [and…] this is a different role than […] making pioneering investments in early stage 
ventures.” On the role of the stock market, as data show, in the United States exit from VC investments occurs mainly 
through the equity market (for example in the form of initial public offering). If the stock market is not well developed, 
exit through an IPO (or, more generally, through a sale of shares) becomes a less likely outcome for the venture 
capitalist, whereas the main channel remains trade sale, with the firm being sold to another enterprise. If this is the case, 
the entrepreneur will ex ante have less incentive to resort to the venture capitalist, given that with a trade sale he risks 
loosing control over the firm (Black and Gilson, 1998). Finally, another argument put forward to explain the link 
between  the  stock  market  and a  well developed  VC  industry  is  that  well functioning  equity markets  induce more 
transparency in price formation and permit easier evaluation of the deals.   10 
A second contribution of the paper is the effort to distinguish the determinants and the 
effects of VC depending on the type of deal. In fact, in our dataset a certain number of deals 
cannot be termed pure venture capital, but rather private equity financing. These deals are 
directed at firms that either need to restructure their balance sheets (turnaround operations) 
or, having been involved in a buy out operation, need financial assistance and advice. One 
obvious way to disentangle the determinants and the effects of private equity deals is to test 
for differential effects by splitting the sample according to a measure of size, given that 
casual  evidence  indicates  that  private  equity  deals  usually  involve  larger  firms.  An 
immediate  critique  of  this  testing  strategy  is  that  large  firms  engaging  in  private  equity 
operations do so for completely different reasons from small firms. In order to address this 
question we borrow some indications from the ample literature on the determinants of a 
firm’s decision to go public (for the case of Italy and a survey on the determinants and 
consequences  of  IPOs,  see  Pagano,  Panetta  and  Zingales,  1998).  We  assume  that  the 
determinants  of  private  equity  financing  are  analogous  to  those  indicated  in  the  IPO 
literature and are related to the financial structure of the firm. In particular, private equity 
deals can be a means to re balance the firm’s financial structure after a period of higher than 
average growth and, in some cases, VC deals precede flotation on the stock market. We 
address this question by augmenting our probit specifications with controls such as leverage 
and profitability measures. 
In  our  data,  venture  capital  operations  are also  directed at  firms  that  already  have 
access  to  bank  finance.  While  there  is  ample  empirical  evidence  on  the  role  of  venture 
capital in reducing asymmetric information problems for small firms lacking collateral and 
on its role as consultant for young and innovative firms, the evidence on the relation between 
venture  capital  finance  and  bank firm  relations  is  much  more  scant.  This  is  presumably 
because for start ups in high tech sectors venture capital finance generally precedes bank 
debt. In the case of firms that are also financed by banks, the theories that rationalize the role 
of venture capital as a source of finance when bank credit is not available are not a useful 
guide in interpreting the role of VC. By stretching the results of Ueda’s model (2004), we 
test whether the intensity of the relationship with the bank has a bearing in explaining the 
demand for venture capital. When the firm borrows from a multiplicity of banks (multiple 
lending), bank firm relationships are probably weak; in this case, it is likely that the firm will   11 
seek the advice of specialized intermediaries such as venture capitalists. Moreover, in the 
presence  of  multiple  lending  the  advisory  role  of  the  venture  capitalist  could  become 
particularly important if firms are near their credit limits with the banks or are already highly 
indebted.  Our  paper  adds  to  the  existing  literature  by  testing  the  importance  of  some 
indicators  of  the  intensity  of  bank firm  relations  and  by verifying the  interpretation  that 
venture  capital  is  needed  when  bank firm  relations  are  weak.  The  detection  of  a  nexus 
between VC demand and bank firm relations may help rationalize the role of venture capital 
over and above that of providing financial resources to start up or innovative firms. 
Our results confirm that, as in the United States, VC is more likely to finance young, 
small and riskier firms. We find evidence that is consistent with both the theories of venture 
capital as a solution to asymmetric information problems and the theories of the venture 
capitalist as consultant. For larger firms the analysis shows that the need to re balance the 
financial structure is one of the main drivers of the deals, consistently with the results of the 
IPO literature. Moreover, we show that the relations with banks are an important determinant 
of venture capital finance, given that firms  with multiple lending relationships and with 
tensions on their credit lines appear to ask more frequently for the services of the venture 
capitalist.  This  novel  result  indicates  that  the  lower  information  disclosure  implied  by 
multiple lending relationships can be overcome by resorting to the venture capitalist. Indeed, 
firms whose projects are difficult to evaluate on the basis of hard information (e.g. balance 
sheet data) probably do need an insider investor who can offer better financing conditions 
than  a  multiplicity  of  uninformed  financiers.
6  The  ex post  analysis  indicates  that  this 
motivation is probably more important for smaller firms, which significantly reduce, after 
the deal, both the number of relations with banks and the amount of bank credit they draw. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sources of our data and its 
main features. In Section 3 we briefly recall various corporate finance theories and empirical 
                                                                 
6   A priori, multiple lending relations do not necessarily reduce the amount of information. If screening and monitoring 
activities are based on hard information (e.g. balance sheet data and project prospectuses) multiple lending increases the 
number of subjects to which information is channeled, thereby implying a wider diffusion of the available information 
set. On the other hand – and this is the case that we have in mind in this paper – if firms have projects that are difficult 
to evaluate and if their balance sheets present a large proportion of intangible assets, it is probably more difficult to rely 
on codified information. From these firms, information to an external investor accrues through a close relationship and 
monitoring is costly for the financier. In this case, multiple lending is associated to the well known free rider problem 
in the information acquisition process.    12 
evidence that are useful to highlight the likely determinants and effects of VC financing; 
Section 4 presents the econometric results of the ex ante analysis, while the results of the 
performance analysis are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Data  
2.1 Sample  
Information on venture capital deals comes from a variety of sources. For the period 
1989 1996 data have been collected by means of a questionnaire sent by the Bank of Italy to 
the main venture capital intermediaries operating in Italy in those years.
7 We were able to 
collect information on 98 deals. For the subsequent period (1997 99) data on the year of the 
deal have been provided by the Italian venture capital association (AIFI). They refer to 243 
deals involving non financial firms.
8 Table 2 shows that in the period considered around 50 
firms received more than one financing.
9 
The availability of the year of the deal and of the identification number of the firm (its 
tax return code) allows us to merge the information on the venture capital deals with firm 
balance sheet data drawn from the Company Account Data Service database (“Centrale dei 
bilanci” CB) and information on credit relationships drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Central 
Credit  Register.  We  matched  about  4,000  firm year  observations  for  the  venture  capital 
sample  for  the  period  1988 2002.  For  about  one quarter  of  the  observations  –  mainly 
                                                                 
7    Specifically, the questionnaire was sent to  venture capitalists in 1999 and asked for information about the number of 
investments each VC firm had made in those years, the date of each deal, the name and the tax return code of the firm 
that received financing. Further information was requested on the investment phase (seed, start up, expansion, buy out 
and turnaround deals); unfortunately, we cannot use this more specific information because it is seldom available for the 
subsequent years (from 1997 onwards). The response rate was quite high (around 90 per cent of the intermediaries who 
received the questionnaire completed and returned it). 
8   Data published by the Italian venture capital association (AIFI) show a larger number of deals. According to these 
statistics, in the period 1997 99, 700 firms received venture capital financing. The difference with our data is mainly 
attributable to the fact that we consider non financial firms only, while AIFI considers also financial firms, holdings and 
real estate brokers. In our sample the much larger number of deals in 1997 99 with respect to the previous period is 
coherent with what is observed from the aggregate figures showing a rapid increase in this form of financing in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
9  47 firms received venture capital financing twice; 4 firms were assisted by the venture capitalist three times. Around 60 
per cent of these firms received their next financing one year after the previous round.   13 
regarding small firms that are less frequently present in the CB database – balance sheet 
information  comes  from  the  Cerved  database  covering  the  universe  of  incorporated 
business.
10  
In the empirical analysis, the main control sample we use is obtained with a random 
selection process from clusters of firms of similar size and operating in the same industries 
as those of our venture capital sample. For the period 1988 2002, this procedure gives us a 
control sample of around 173,000 observations out of more than 685,000 of the entire CB 
database. To check for robustness of the results we also use the entire CB database and two 
other control samples obtained in a similar way to the one just described.  
2.2 Descriptive statistics  
Some of the venture backed (VB) firms in our sample are large ones. As we already 
noted,  some  of  the  deals  in  Europe  (and  in  Italy)  were  private  equity  (buy out  or 
restructuring) rather than venture capital deals. Private equity operations typically involve 
large firms and it is conceivable that the determinants and the effects of venture capital 
financing  are  different  between  these  two  categories  of  firms.  It  would  be  advisable  to 
conduct  the  analysis  separately  for  these  deals  in  order  to  distinguish  more  sharply  the 
determinants and the effects of pure venture capital (i.e. the financing of small and riskier 
firms)  from  those  of  private  equity  (that  typically  entail  a  balance sheet  restructuring). 
Unfortunately, we do not have direct evidence of private equity deals in our dataset. Hence, 
we try to separate the different types of operations by splitting our sample according to size, 
given that casual observation indicates that the majority of private equity deals involve larger 
                                                                 
10   The whole CB database available to us covers balance sheets and income statements for some 35,000 non financial 
firms from 1982 to 2003. The financial statements are collected by a consortium of banks; firms enter the sample by 
borrowing from one of the banks in the consortium. Besides the standard financial variables, the database contains 
balance sheet items, as well as information on firm characteristics (year of foundation, location, type of organization 
and ownership status, group membership), employment, flow of funds and the firm’s credit score, computed by the CB. 
The sample has a much broader coverage than most datasets used in economic research, since it includes a large number 
of unlisted companies and many very small firms. The sample may be biased towards firms with multiple banking 
relationships, which are in turn more likely to be large firms. For further information on the sample and on data 
availability,  see  the  Centrale  dei  bilanci  website  (www.centraledeibilanci.com).  The  Cerved  Business  Information 
dataset virtually includes the universe of incorporated business in Italy (see www.cerved.com for information); data are 
available from 1993 onwards, but information on firm balance sheets is less detailed than that of the CB.   14 
firms. We define small and medium firms (SMEs) as those with a value of total assets of less 
than 20 million euro in the first year in which the firm is present in the database.
11  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the summary statistics on the control sample of SMEs. In 
Panel A, data are averages over the period 1988 1999, the sample period for the ex ante 
analysis (conducted in Section 4). The median firm records a value of sales of 5.3 million 
euros, total assets of 3.8, 29 employees and is 15 years old. On average, around 3 per cent of 
the firms are in high tech sectors. For the median firm, intangible assets represent less than 5 
per cent of intangible and fixed assets. As for profitability, the return on equity is 5.7 per 
cent;  the  median  value  added  per  employee  is  3.9  million  euros.  The  median  company 
exhibits a leverage (defined as the ratio of debt over the sum of debt and equity) of 54 per 
cent,  a  coverage  ratio  (the  ratio  of  EBIT  over  interest  expense)  of  2.4,  and  capital 
expenditures (CAPEX, the rate of change of fixed assets) of 0.4 per cent. The median firm 
draws credit from 5 banks and the share of credit drawn from the first bank is around 50 per 
cent. Firms with a ratio of short term credit drawn to credit granted at least equal to 110 per 
cent are 4.0 per cent of the sample. 
In Panel B we report the statistics for venture backed SMEs;
12 data refer to the year 
before the deal. We have 253 such deals involving firms with a value of total assets of less 
than 20 million euros. For each variable a star indicates whether the difference between the 
mean of the control sample and that of the VB firms is significant. The first thing to note is 
that VB firms are younger than in the control sample (median age is 6 years). As regards size 
– measured either by sales, by total assets or by the number of employees – the median VB 
firm tends to be larger than in the control sample. This is in contrast with the suggestions of 
theory  and  empirical  evidence  relative  to  the  United  States.  This  result  is  partially 
attributable to the fact that some of these firms might have been involved in private equity 
deals. Thus, even if we have tried to capture this form of financing by splitting our sample 
                                                                 
11   We used the breakdown according to total assets since information on sales or on the number of employees is less 
complete. 20 million euros is the value of the 75
th percentile of the distribution of total assets for firms with less than 
250 employees. Information on deals classified as private equity for 2000 02 (not considered in our sample, given the 
limited number of operations available) shows that the median value of total assets of these firms is around 25 million 
euros. 
12  For some of the venture backed firms we were not able to recover the balance sheet information. On the whole (i.e. 
considering  the deals  involving both  SMEs  and  larger  firms),  for  319  deals  we  were  able  to recover  at  least  the 
information on the firm total assets; this compares with the total of 341 deals in our initial sample (see Table 2).    15 
according to size, it may well be that even among SMEs, the larger ones have been party to 
private equity deals. Moreover, one thing worth noting is that in the venture capital sample 
there is a wider dispersion – as measured by the difference between the 95
th and the 5
th 
percentile – of the variables that proxy for size. As for the other variables, as expected, VB 
firms are more frequent in the high tech industries and their median share of intangibles is 
much higher (around 14 per cent) than in the control sample. They are also riskier than those 
in the control sample: our variable RISK – defined as the standard deviation of ROE at the 
industry level – is on average 42 per cent, as opposed to 39 per cent in the control sample. 
As regards performance measures, VB firms show higher growth (in terms of sales), higher 
investment  (CAPEX)  and  a  higher  value  added  per  employee  (though  the  latter  two 
differences are not significant). Both profitability and leverage are lower than for firms in the 
control  sample,  whereas  interest  coverage  is  similar  between  the  two  samples.  The 
concentration  of  bank  credit,  measured  either  by  the  share  of  the  first  bank  or  by  the 
Herfindahl index, turns out to be lower than in the control sample, whereas the percentage of 
firms in overdraft is similar in the two samples. The share of long term loans is higher for 
VB firms. 
Turning to large firms (panels C and D), the comparison between VB and non VB 
firms indicates that large VB firms are also younger than those in the control sample and 
have a higher share of intangible assets. They also have a lower value added per employee. 
Contrary to the evidence for smaller firms, large VB firms are more indebted than those in 
the control sample; the low concentration of bank credit observed for small firms is even 
more pronounced for large ones.  
Summing up, the descriptive analysis shows that venture backed SMEs are younger, 
grow more, have a larger share of intangibles, a lower concentration of bank credit and lower 
profits than other firms. For larger VB firms another difference with respect to the control 
sample is the higher level of indebtedness.    16 
3. What  theory  and  (previous)  empirical  evidence  suggest  about  the  role  of 
venture capital  
This Section draws on corporate finance theories and previous empirical evidence that 
we use to select a list of controls capable of explaining the determinants of VC finance and a 
set of variables likely to be affected by VC deals. There is no single theory that of itself is 
able to explain the rationale of venture capital contracts, although, as will become clearer 
when we illustrate the different theories, there is some overlapping among them. 
In Table 4 we summarize the main indications that we briefly discuss in this Section. It 
should be clear from the table that to distinguish among competing theories the empirical 
analysis has to be devoted not only to the determinants of venture capital deals, but also to 
their effects on firm performance.  
3.1 Asymmetric information   
The  theoretical  literature  on  venture  capital  contracts  indicates  that  the  direct 
involvement  of  these  intermediaries  in  the  day to day  life  of  the  firm  gives  them  an 
advantage in financing firms that are more difficult for external investors to evaluate. As 
stressed  by Berger  and Udell  (1998),  young  and  small  firms  lack  the  visibility  of  more 
established and larger firms, and are more likely to suffer from asymmetric information 
problems: for the financing of their investments they rely heavily on internal funds and on 
informal  finance.
13  The  existence  of  venture  capital  might  fill  the  gap  in  the  access  to 
external resources for small firms. The degree of asymmetric information is also likely to be 
high for firms whose assets are difficult to evaluate, such as those whose main asset is a new 
product yet to be launched on the market or those with a large share of intangible assets in 
their balance sheets. Moreover, little availability of real assets reduces the possibility of 
seizing them in the event of default, thereby giving less credibility to the threat of liquidation 
by banks. This, in turn, reduces the effort of the entrepreneur and decreases the likelihood of 
accessing bank finance.  
                                                                 
13  See also Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Fluck, Holtz Eakin and Rosen (1998). For the oversight role of the venture 
capitalist see Lerner (1995).   17 
In the empirical analysis of the determinants of venture capital, we use the logarithm of 
firm sales (SIZE) as a proxy for company size. AGE (in logarithm) is calculated using the 
date of incorporation of the firm. Finally, we use INTANGIBLES, defined as the share of 
intangible over the sum of intangible and tangible assets, to proxy for the difficulties of 
external investors in evaluating the activity of the firm. All these variables have an expected 
positive sign on the probability of VC finance.  
Asymmetric  information  models  are  also  useful  to  make  explicit  the  likely 
consequences  of  venture  capital.  The  certification  effect  due  to  the  participation  of  the 
venture capitalist in the firm should reduce the premium required by external investors and 
increase the amount of external finance the firm can raise directly on the market or from 
banks (Holmström and Tirole, 1997). This, in turn, should have a positive impact on firm 
LEVERAGE. On the other hand, if the firm already has access to bank finance, it could be 
that venture capital finance substitutes for bank finance and this could imply a contraction of 
leverage  after  the  deal.  With  respect  to  firm  performance,  profits  should  increase  to 
remunerate the effort of the venture capitalist.  
3.2 Bank firm relations and venture capital 
Ueda  (2004)  discusses  the  trade offs  between  venture  capital  financing  and  bank 
financing. As in other models of asymmetric information, for bank financing to be viable a 
certain amount of collateral is needed, since the bank is less informed than the entrepreneur. 
In  her  model  the  venture  capitalist  and  the  entrepreneur  are  equally  informed  about  the 
projects;  this  fact  facilitates  financing  to  firms  with  low  collateral,  but  exposes  the 
entrepreneur to the risk of project expropriation by the venture capitalist. The predictions of 
this model are that the probability of receiving venture capital rather than bank financing is 
higher for firms perceived as riskier by banks, i.e. those with less collateral. 
Stretching Ueda’s results and hypothesizing that firms are already financed by banks, it 
is likely that the quality of information and the amount of collateral available to banks are 
inversely related to the number of banking relationships the firm has. 
More specifically, both the presence of multiple lending relationships and tensions in 
firms’  credit  lines  with  banks  are  likely  explanations  of  the  demand  for  venture  capital   18 
finance. In the first case, if the relationship with banks is characterized by multiple lending, 
it  is  likely  that  the  firm  –  lacking  a  main  bank  –  will  seek  the  advice  of  specialized 
intermediaries  such  as  the  venture  capitalist.
14  Moreover,  for  a  given  limited  amount  of 
collateral, the financing of firms that borrow from many banks becomes ex ante riskier for 
the bank itself, mainly because of coordination problems in seizing collateral that are likely 
to be encountered when the number of outside creditors is high (Bris and Welch, 2005). 
Hence, a testable implication is that, controlling for size, the probability of being financed by 
a venture capitalist depends positively on the (log of the) number of banks (BANKS).  
As for the consequences of VC financing, the model of Ueda predicts that after the 
deal profits should increase to compensate the entrepreneur for the risk of being expropriated 
by the venture capitalist. Hence, some measure of profitability (such as ROE – return on 
equity, or ROA – return on assets, or cash flow) should be comparatively higher than that of 
the other firms.  
3.3 The venture capitalist as consultant  
As a form of specialized financing, the venture capitalist gives advice to the firm under 
many guises. The empirical analysis for the United States has shown that VB firms are more 
innovative than non VB ones, whether innovations in production processes or innovative 
products  are  considered.  They  also  appear  to  be  faster  in  implementing  new  patents 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2000). For young firms, VC advice includes marketing services and the 
upgrading of the commercial network; this, in turn, fosters an increase in sales.
15 Moreover, 
venture capital financing is associated with a higher patenting rate of relevant technological 
products  (Kortum  and  Lerner,  1998).  VC  activity  should  be  more  likely  in  innovative 
industries, which have a high level of R&D expenses, or for firms characterized by high 
                                                                 
14  As we argued in the introduction, in the case of creditors relying on soft information, multiple lending can reduce the 
amount of monitoring. Another mechanism that can induce a positive relationship between the number of banks and the 
demand for venture capital is the one described in Yosha (1995). His model predicts that firms with more sensitive 
information — e.g. innovative firms, firms in high tech sectors and firms with high R&D intensity — want to minimize 
the loss of non public information. One way to do so is to reduce the number of banks to which information accrues. 
We did not consider this mechanism explicitly here. 
15  Jain and Kini (1995).    19 
growth,  in  terms  of  sales  or  investment.  Indeed,  it  is  likely  that  enterprises  needing  to 
consolidate their results will seek the venture capitalist services.
16  
The direction of causality between venture capital and the degree of innovation is an 
open issue. Some empirical studies have found that more VC financing fosters innovation 
(‘venture capital first’ hypothesis, e.g. Kortum and Lerner, 1998), while others document 
that the venture capital deal follows the discovery of a new technology and that venture 
capital services are needed to market such innovations (‘innovation first’ hypothesis, e.g. 
Hirukawa and Ueda, 2003).
17  
The  theories  that  stress  the  advisory  role  of  the  venture  capitalist  imply  that  the 
likelihood of this form of financing should be higher for firms with high investments or high 
growth.  We  calculate  firm  investment  as  CAPEX,  the  rate  of  change  of  fixed  assets. 
GROWTH is calculated as the difference between each firm’s sales rate of growth and that 
of the industry to which the firm belongs. Differences in the intensity of innovation are 
proxied by the HIGH TECH dummy, which takes the value of 1 in industries with a high 
“innovative” content.
18 Finally, the variable INTANGIBLES should be positively correlated 
with the probability of being assisted by the venture capitalist.  
The evidence on the consequences of VC should help shed some light on the direction 
of causality; if the venture capital first hypothesis dominates in the Italian case, then we 
should  expect  an  increase  in  CAPEX,  GROWTH,  INTANGIBLES  and  the  capital  per 
employee ratio after the operation. If, on the contrary, is the innovation first hypothesis that 
dominates, we do not expect either the accumulation of INTANGIBLES or GROWTH to 
continue  after  the  deal.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  turnaround  or  buy out  operations 
                                                                 
16  For a theoretical model, see Casamatta (2003). 
17   Hirukawa and Ueda (2003) find that venture capital financing is more frequent in industries that have had an increase in 
total factor productivity, which the Authors interpret as a proxy for innovation; after the venture capital deal, they find a 
negative correlation between venture capital financing and the subsequent growth in total factor productivity at the 
industry level.  
18   Using the four digit industry codes, we classify a firm to be a high technology one if it belongs to one of the following 
industries:  chemical  and  pharmaceutical  products,  aerospace,  electronic  equipment,  media,  telecommunications, 
software  and  hardware.  In  the econometric analysis  we  also  control  for  other  nine  industry dummies:  agriculture, 
energy,  construction,  food,  services  and  the  four  industries  according  to  the  Pavitt  classification:  traditional 
manufacturing goods, scale intensive industries, specialized suppliers industries, and other manufacturing.    20 
(presumably for larger firms) we expect an increase in efficiency, which we proxy with the 
(log of) value added per employee.  
3.4 Re balancing the financial structure  
After periods of higher than normal expansion in investment, firms usually have high 
indebtedness. Moreover, riskier and smaller firms are usually granted short term debt. VC 
financing can help by itself to re balance the financial structure towards equity. Moreover, 
since one of the successful ways to divest is through flotation on the stock market, a high 
LEVERAGE firm will try to involve a venture capitalist in its attempt to access the stock 
market. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) find for a sample of Italian firms that initial 
public offerings are above all a means to reduce leverage.  
Similarly to the predictions under 3.3, the probability of VC finance should be greater 
for high growth firms. In the case of financial structure re balancing, we also expect that if 
these firms were already financed by banks, the likelihood of demanding VC will be higher 
if they suffer from tensions on their bank credit lines. Finally, riskier firms should be more 
willing to re balance their financial structure: in fact, the desire to raise new capital and 
reduce leverage should be greater for companies with higher risk, which implies a larger cost 
of foregone diversification for the entrepreneur. This indication is derived from models of 
portfolio diversification (Pagano, 1993). 
The indications for the consequences of VC deals are, however, different from those 
discussed in 3.1 and 3.3. If the re balancing of the financial structure is an important reason 
for the demand for VC, then we expect a reduction in leverage after the deal. Moreover, it is 
likely that firms will try to lengthen the maturity of their liabilities, in order to facilitate the 
completion of projects that usually need a long period of time to break even. As Bergemann 
and Hege (1998) note, when a firm finances long term projects with short term credit the 
risk of interruption is high and firms will try to lengthen the maturity of their liabilities.  
In the empirical analysis we use LEVERAGE as a proxy of the level of indebtedness. 
The  expected  sign  of  this  variable  is  uncertain  (as  in  paragraph  3.1).  In  fact,  if  the  re 
balancing  of  the  financial  structure  theory  is  a  valid  one,  we  should  expect  that  more 
leveraged firms are more likely to be financed by a venture capitalist. On the other hand, a   21 
low leverage can signal financial constraints and the need to resort to alternative sources of 
finance, such as venture capital. To proxy for tensions in credit lines, we use the dummy 
OVERDRAFT, which takes the value of 1 if the ratio between credit drawn from banks and 
the amount of loans granted is at least equal to 110 per cent; we expect a positive sign for 
this variable. We proxy RISK with the standard deviation of the distribution of profitability 
(the Return on Equity) for all the companies in the same industry. 
As  for  the  consequences  of  VC  operations,  we  expect  a  reduction  in  leverage  (in 
contrast with the predictions under 3.1); as argued in the introduction, this prediction should 
apply  in  particular  to  private  equity  deals.  After  the  deal,  if  the  theory  of  the  financial 
structure re balancing is verified, we also expect an increase in long term loans as a ratio of 
total loans (LTLO) and a decrease in the ratio of credit drawn over credit granted (CDCG in 
the table), as tensions on bank credit lines are likely to be eased.  
3.5 Other theories 
As should be clear from Table 4, in this Section we have discussed the theories and 
previous empirical evidence that we judge directly testable given our dataset. In concluding 
the Section, to give a fair account of the analysis on this form of financing it is useful to 
present a brief review of other important contributions that unfortunately we are not able to 
test in the paper. This should also clarify the limits of our data.  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2000, 2004) test the importance of different corporate finance 
and contract theory predictions by analyzing the characteristics of venture capital contracts. 
By analyzing the allocation of cash flow and control rights between the VC and the firm and 
the determinants (such as firm performance) that trigger a change in this allocation, Kaplan 
and Strömberg are able to test the predictions of theoretical models on the optimal allocation 
of control and cash flow rights. Moreover, their results suggest that “agency and hold up 
problems are important to contract design and monitoring”.  
The limits of our dataset – in particular the scant number of pure venture capital deals 
(i.e. those directed to start ups) – make it difficult to test the relevance of the staging process 
in the Italian case. Gompers and Lerner (1999) show that the staging of financing allows the 
VC to increase his/her information set and monitor the progress of the firm. Unfortunately,   22 
we do not have information on the whole number of financing rounds and cannot test this 
result for the Italian case. Lacking information of the exit strategy of the VC, we are not able 
to test the relation between this form of financing and a firm going public decision (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1999). 
Finally,  another  important  issue  concerns  the  composition  of  venture  capital  funds 
according to type of investor (i.e banks, pension funds and other institutional investors). 
Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2004) show that the different composition may have important 
consequences on the portfolio allocation of the fund. In particular, they find that venture 
investments are more likely to be directed towards less innovative firms if banks have a 
major role in the fund. Again, we cannot test this issue for the Italian case as we lack the 
information on the composition of the funds.  
4. The determinants of venture capital financing 
4.1 The econometric set up  
The  multivariate  analysis  performed  in  this  Section  will  allow  us  to  quantify  the 
importance  of  the  different  determinants  of  venture  capital  financing  and  examine  more 
thoroughly the competing explanations briefly outlined in Section 3.  
Based on the theoretical predictions on the variables that should affect the likelihood of 
venture capital financing, we estimate various versions of the following probit model: 
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where  VBi,t  is  a  variable  equal  to  0  if  company  i  is  not  financed  by  the  venture 
capitalist in that year and equals 1 in the year of the first financing (after a company is 
financed for the first time, we drop it from the sample). SIZEi,t 1 is the log value of the sales 
of company i in year t 1 and SIZE
2
i,t 1 is its quadratic form, which is meant to control for the 
presence of non linearities. AGEi,t 1is the log of firm age. INTANGIBLESi,t 1 is the ratio of   23 
intangible assets over the sum of intangible and real assets. LEVERAGEi,t 1 is the ratio of 
debt over the sum of debt plus equity. ROEi,t 1 is the return on equity. HIGH TECHi,t 1 is a 
dummy equal to 1 for companies in high tech sectors that we have defined in Section 3. To 
measure firm expansion we use, alternatively, GROWTHi,t 1 (the difference between a firm’s 
sales growth and that of its industry) and CAPEX i,t 1 (the rate of change of tangible assets), 
which proxies for investment activity. RISKi,t 1 is the risk of company i, proxied by the 
cross sectional variability of the ROE of companies in the same industry; BANKSi,t 1 is the 
(log of the) number of banks that grant credit to the firm. OVERDRAFT i,t 1  is the dummy 
meant to capture the presence of tensions in the credit lines granted by banks. Finally, we 
control for industry and year dummies. To avoid simultaneity, the firm specific variables are 
lagged one year. 
The  expected  signs  of  the  variables  are  those  commented  in  Section  3.  The  only 
variable we have not directly derived from our theoretical survey is profitability. The sign of 
this control is uncertain: a high ROE could be associated with abundant internal funds and 
with less need for external finance; if this is the case we should expect a negative sign for 
this variable. On the other hand, a high ROE could signal high quality firms and might be 
associated with a higher propensity of the venture capitalist to finance them; in this case, the 
sign should turn out to be positive.  
4.2 Results for the whole sample  
Table 5 presents the results obtained estimating equation (1). Column (a) of Table 5 
reports the results of our baseline specification using the control sample presented in Table 
3. By using the sample selected randomly among firms of similar size and industries as the 
venture backed ones, we try to minimize the risk of including in the control sample firms 
that are not inclined to resort to the venture capitalist and to obtain a sharper comparison 
among the characteristics of venture backed and non venture backed companies. 
In column (a) attention is confined to the variables with the coefficients from a1 to a7 
(controlling  for  industry  and  time  dummies).  This  is  done  to  maximize  the  number  of 
observations on which estimation is performed; in fact, employing variables such as CAPEX 
or GROWTH would imply a loss of observations given that they are calculated over year t 1   24 
and  t 2.  The  variables  that  come  from  the  Central  Credit  Register  imply  a  loss  of 
observations too, since we were not always able to match the CB database with the former. 
Consistently with the theories of asymmetric information, the signs of SIZE and AGE 
turn out to be negative; the existence of a non linear relation between the probability of 
receiving  venture  capital  and  size  also  emerges.  Consistently  both  with  asymmetric 
information theories and with the role of the venture capitalist as consultant, firms with a 
high share of intangibles and in HIGH TECH sectors are more likely to be financed by the 
venture capitalist.
19 In this basic regression, results seem to contradict the theory of financial 
structure  re balancing,  given  that  the  sign  of  LEVERAGE  is  negative  and  marginally 
significant. This result is consistent with the theory that predicts a higher demand for venture 
capital finance by firms that encounter more difficulties in accessing debt finance. Finally, 
profitability is not significant.  
We  check  the  robustness  of  these  results  in  various  ways.  We  re estimated 
specification (a) using different lags of the variables. In particular, if SIZE, LEVERAGE and 
ROE  are  entered  with  a  lag  of  two  years  (results  not  reported)  the  basic  results  are 
confirmed, with the exception of LEVERAGE – which becomes not significant – and ROE – 
which becomes negative and significant. The latter result indicates that firms with more 
internal resources are less likely to ask for venture capital advice.
20 We then estimate a 
random effects probit model with the same controls as column (a); again in this case results 
are virtually unchanged. 
                                                                 
19   By construction the High tech dummy can be considered an industry like the other nine standard industries described 
previously.  In  the  probit  analysis  the  other  industries  considered  are:  agriculture,  energy,  food,  traditional 
manufacturing  goods,  scale intensive  industries,  specialized  supplier  industries,  other  manufacturing  industries  and 
services. The dummy for the Construction industry is dropped from the probit.  
20   Moreover, we check that our results were robust when lagging other variables (such as INTANGIBLES) for two years 
or using averages of the variables over time t 1 and t 2. In these cases too, the main indications reported in column (a) 
of Table 5 are confirmed. Finally, we re estimate the model in column (a) using alternative definitions of company size, 
profitability, leverage, and intangibles. Specifically, we calculate size as the log of total assets; we measure profitability 
with the return on investment (ROI) or with the return on assets (defined as EBITDA over total assets). We calculate 
leverage including also commercial debt. Intangible assets are calculated as a fraction of total assets. In all these cases 
(estimates not reported) the results are coherent with those in column (a) of Table 5.   25 
Column (b) of the table reports the results obtained estimating the baseline model 
using  the  whole  CB  control  sample  rather  than  the  randomly  selected  one.  The  results 
indicate that the sign and significance of the coefficients are similar to those in column (a).
21 
We  then  estimate  the  richer  model  (c)  for  the  whole  set  of  variables  reported  in 
equation (1). As previously noted this implies a substantial loss of observations: the number 
of venture capital deals over which estimation is performed is almost halved (from 217 to 
125 deals) and we lose, in particular, the observations for smaller firms. We use CAPEX to 
measure the expansion of the firm. Results confirm that firms that are younger and have a 
high share of intangible assets in their balance sheet are more likely to be financed by a 
venture  capitalist.  SIZE,  LEVERAGE  and  the  HIGH TECH  dummy  turn  out  to  be  not 
significant.  We  checked  that  this  result  was  due  to  the  different  sample  by  estimating 
specification (a) using the observations of specification (c). Indeed, results (not reported) 
indicate that the loss in significance is attributable to the different sample. As regards the 
other variables in specification (c), results show that firms’ rapid expansion (proxied with the 
investment rate,  CAPEX)  is  positively  associated  with  venture  capital  financing.  This  is 
consistent with the theories of financial structure re balancing and of the advisory role of the 
venture capitalist. As regards the relation with the banks, we show that our proxy of multiple 
lending (BANKS) is positively related to the probability of VC: firms with multiple lending 
relationships tend to be financed more frequently by the venture capitalist, a result that is 
consistent  with  theories  that  relate  venture  capital  demand  to  the  type  of  banking 
relationships.  Finally,  the  positive  sign  for  the  overdraft  dummy  is  consistent  with  the 
theories of financial structure re balancing. 
As a last robustness check we control for the fact that one firm can receive venture 
capital  finance  more  than  once.  First  of  all,  we  re estimate  model  (a)  by  changing  our 
dependent variable and considering the dummy VB equal to 1 also for deals that occur after 
the first financing operation; in the analysis we control for multiple operations by means of a 
                                                                 
21   With two other random control samples selected in a similar way to the main one results (not reported) also do not 
change significantly with respect to those presented in column (a) of Table 5.   26 
dummy  variable.
22  In  this  case  too  (estimates  not  reported)  results  of  column  (a)  are 
confirmed. 
Moreover, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model, where the dependent variable 
is the time span between one venture capital deal (the failure event) and the other. For the 
first deal the time span is calculated, at the firm level, as the difference between the year of 
the first operation and the first available observation. In the case of firms that record more 
than one deal, the time span is calculated as the interval between one venture capital deal and 
the other (time since last failure). For firms that were not backed by a venture capitalist 
during the sample period, the time span coincides with the number of years the firm is 
present in the database. Multiple failure models are suited to take into account the fact that 
each firm can be financed more than once. We also control for differences among groups of 
firms  that  have  received  a  different  number  of  financings  by  stratifying  the  estimation. 
Results (column (d) of Table 5) are broadly in line with those obtained by means of the 
probit model, with the exception of LEVERAGE and the HIGH TECH dummy that are not 
significant. Furthermore, profitability turns out to be negative and significant. All in all, the 
duration model confirms that venture capital financing is more likely for smaller, younger 
and less collateralized firms.  
  The results of the ex ante analysis for the Italian case confirm that venture capital is a 
more frequent form of financing for small, young and innovative firms. The econometric 
evidence also shows that venture capital is frequently employed when there are tensions on 
credit  lines  with  banks  and  when  the  firm  has  multiple  lending  relationships,  thereby 
indicating that the intensity of the relations with banks is inversely related to the demand for 
venture capital. These findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of the information 
asymmetries theories.  
                                                                 
22   Considering the first deal only is equivalent to the hypothesis that the characteristics of venture backed firms may differ 
from those of non venture backed firms independently of the number of times each firm is financed. This hypothesis is 
plausible since one of the features of venture capital is that financing occurs in stages. Moreover, as we have already 
noted, the majority of firms in our sample received the next financing after one year and we believe it is highly unlikely 
that firm characteristics change much during this time span. On the other hand, discarding the subsequent deals from the 
sample implies a loss of information, a fact that makes it advisable to perform the robustness checks presented in the 
text.    27 
4.3 Differences according to firm size  
As we saw in Section 2 there are large differences in the variables that proxy for the 
financial  structure  and  bank firm  relationships  among  smaller  and  larger  firms.  In  this 
paragraph  we  check  for  the  presence  of  differences  in  the  probability  of  VC  finance 
according to firm size.  
We re estimate the probit regressions using, in blocks, all the variables listed in model 
(1) by splitting the sample among small firms (SMEs) and larger ones. The “Dummy Large” 
is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for firms with at least 20 million euros in total assets. 
For each specification, the effect on the probability for larger firms is given by the sum of 
the coefficient in the column “SME” and the coefficient in the column “Dummy Large”. Our 
estimation procedure (i.e. inserting in blocks the various controls) aims to avoid the loss of 
too many observations; in fact, in the previous paragraph we saw that the number of deals is 
almost halved when estimating the richest model (see column (c) of Table 5). Moreover, as 
Table 6 shows, the correlation between some of the variables of model (1) is quite high and 
significant. Hence, by inserting the variables in blocks we try to minimize the presence of 
multicollinearity. Finally, we re estimate the various specifications presented in the table 
over the same sample; in this way we check whether the different results are driven by the 
different number of observations. 
In column (a) of Table 7 we report the results obtained using the same specification 
presented  in  column  (a)  of  Table  5;  all  the  firm level  variables  are  interacted  with  the 
dummy for large firms. The results obtained for the whole sample are confirmed, but unlike 
small firms, large ones are more likely to be financed by the venture capitalist when they are 
more  indebted  rather  than  less  indebted.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  theories  of 
financial structure re balancing. 
In  column  (b)  we  add  to  the  basic  model  one  of  our  firm  expansion  proxies 
(GROWTH);  as  for  CAPEX  in  the  previous  paragraph,  for  GROWTH  the  sign  is  also 
positive and significant, a result that is consistent with the theories of financial structure re 
balancing and of the advisory role of the venture capitalist. For large firms the effect of 
growth on the probability of venture capital is larger than for small ones. With specification   28 
(b) LEVERAGE turns out to be not significant, a difference with respect to column (a) that 
is attributable to the different sample.
23 
Controlling  for  the  investment  rate  (CAPEX;  column  (c))  confirms  that  the  rapid 
expansion of firms is associated with venture capital financing. The sign and significance of 
all the other variables are the same as those obtained for the baseline model of column (a), 
with the exception of the differential effect of LEVERAGE for larger firms.
24 In column (d) 
we  add  to  the  baseline  specification  our  proxy  of  firm  risk  (RISK);  according  to  the 
suggestions of the theory, small and riskier firms are significantly more likely to be financed 
by the venture capitalist, whereas the effect of RISK is almost nil for larger firms. Finally, in 
column (e) we add the bank firm relationship variables and the dummy OVERDRAFT. It 
emerges  that  both  coefficients  are  positive  and  that  there  are  no  significant  differences 
according to size.  
The  results  for  the  sample  split  according  to  size  show  that  the  main  difference 
concerns leverage: in fact, with the specifications in columns (a) and (d) we find that large 
firms  use  this  form  of  financing  when  they  are  highly  leveraged,  consistently  with  the 
financial  structure  re balancing  theory.  However,  this  result  is  not  robust  to  different 
specifications of the model and we need to turn to the analysis of the effects of venture 
capital to be better able to disentangle the importance of the different theories. 
5. The effects of venture capital on firm performance 
5.1 The econometric set up  
The ex ante analysis of venture capital determinants sheds only partial light on the 
relative importance of the different theories we have summarized. Moreover, differences 
between  firms  according  to  their  size  might  well  be  more  visible  by  looking  at  the 
                                                                 
23  
 The estimation (results not reported) of the specification in column (a) on the sample used in column (b) indicates that 
LEVERAGE turns out to be not significant in this case too.  
24  
 In this case too the estimation (results not reported) of the specification in column (a) on the sample of specification (c) 
indicates that the difference regarding leverage is due to the different (smaller) sample.    29 
consequences of venture capital financing on firm performance. It is for these reasons that 
this Section is devoted to the analysis of the performance – in terms of various balance sheet 
indicators – of venture backed firms relative to the companies that did not receive this form 
of financing. 
For the main accounting and financial variables (denoted yit) we estimate the following 
fixed effect regression:  
t i, t i 3 2 1 t i, ε d u 4 13 0 y + + + + + + = T VC β VC β VC β α            (2) 
where VC0 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the year of the deal. It 
should be pointed out that if the firm is financed more than once in our sample period, the 
dummy takes value 1 more than once, specifically in the year of each operation. VC13 is a 
dummy equal to 1 in the three years after the deals and, finally, VC4T is 1 from the fourth 
year after the deals.
25 This latter variable should capture longer term effects on the relevant 
balance sheet variables. ui and dt are, respectively, firm and calendar (year) dummies. Fixed 
effect estimation allows us to control for firm specific characteristics that are time invariant 
but that could be correlated with the venture capital deals, such as industry or managerial 
quality. 
The methodology we use for the ex post analysis is the same as the one presented in 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) in their study on firms’ listing decision. In particular, 
we look at the effects of VC finance on a larger set of variables than that used as controls in 
the analysis of the determinants of VC finance. This is done to reduce endogeneity problems 
that arise when fixed effect estimation is performed using the VC dummies as exogenous 
variables to explain variables such as ROE or LEVERAGE, which the ex ante analysis has 
shown  to  be  correlated  with  the  VC  financing  event  itself.
26  Moreover,  we  check 
(regressions not reported) that our results are robust to richer specifications that include not 
                                                                 
25   Overall, in the sample used for the ex post analysis, 284 firms received at least one financing, 45 were financed twice 
and  only  4  were  party  to  three  deals.  No  firm  received  financing  more  than  three  times.  We  experimented  with 
alternative definitions of the ex post dummies to check for the robustness of the results. The first check was performed 
using separate sets of dummies for each financing operation; we also estimated the fixed effect regressions by looking 
at the effects after the first financing operation and, alternatively, after the last financing only. None of the main results 
that we present in this Section were significantly affected.   
26   In this case, in fact, the VC dummies cannot be considered strictly exogenous, thus violating the fixed effect model 
assumption of strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables, Wooldridge (2002).     30 
only the deal dummies (as in model (2)) but also other balance sheet variables likely to be 
correlated with each firm variable (y) we are examining.  
5.2 Results  
Table 8 reports separately the results for small and medium enterprises and for large 
firms. As for the measure of profitability (ROE), for small venture backed firms ROE drops 
with respect to the other firms in the interim period (i.e. from t+1 to t+3). No significant 
difference  among  venture backed  and  non venture backed  SMEs  emerges  either  if  we 
consider return on sales (ROS) or value added per employee. We also experimented other 
variables, such as ROA, Cash flow/Assets or return on investment (results not reported): 
again venture backed SMEs do not behave in a significantly different way from firms in the 
control sample. For venture backed larger firms a weak increase in profitability shows up if 
we consider ROE, value added per employee, ROA and ROI (the latter two results are not 
reported).
27   
As for the other measures of performance, results show that venture backed SMEs’ 
capital expenditures (CAPEX) grow only in the year of the deal and subsequently decrease. 
No  significant  difference  emerges  for  larger  firms.
28  As  complementary  measures  to 
CAPEX, we consider fixed assets per employee and total assets: venture backed SMEs show 
an increase in these two variables with respect to the control sample, whereas no significant 
effect is detected for larger ones.  
The share of intangibles assets decreases in the long run for small firms, whereas large 
firms record an increase in the short term and in the interim period. Growth in terms of sales 
of both small and large venture backed firms contracts in the longer term; this is confirmed 
whether we look at the differential effect with respect to the industry in which the firm 
operates (the variable GROWTH)
29 or at the rate of change in sales. Moreover, no long run 
                                                                 
27   We enriched the ROE regression controlling for SIZE. Results (not reported) confirm that ROE decreases for venture 
backed SMEs and increases slightly for larger ones.   
28   We enriched the CAPEX regression controlling for SIZE and GROWTH (not reported). Again, results are confirmed.   
29   We enriched the GROWTH regression controlling for SIZE (not reported). Results are confirmed.     31 
effect is detected for the rate of growth of total assets and a long term contraction in the rate 
of change of employees emerges for SMEs.  
The  evidence  on  the  ex post  performance,  coupled  with  the  results  of  the  ex ante 
analysis that showed a significant correlation between growth and the probability of venture 
capital, seems to indicate that the innovation first hypothesis, rather than the venture capital 
first hypothesis is validated by our data. Venture capital financing occurs after a period of 
higher than average investment and growth and contributes to the consolidation of a firm’s 
result, rather than spurring further innovation and growth. Venture capital financing, though 
not directly affecting the measures of growth, seems to facilitate consolidation in firms’ 
results, as is evident from the long term effect on size for SMEs. 
As for the measures of indebtedness, larger firms reduce their leverage; the effect is 
also significant in the long run (though at the 10 per cent level). This finding confirms the 
hypothesis drawn from the ex ante analysis that it is for large firms (presumably involved in 
private equity deals) that the theory of re balancing of the financial structure is valid. For 
venture backed SMEs a certification effect seems to be at work, given the increase in their 
indebtedness.  This  result  has  to  be  interpreted  cautiously,  given  that  the  results  for  an 
alternative indicator of indebtedness (Debt/sales) confirm only the contraction of debt for 
larger firms.
30  
In the long run small firms significantly reduce the number of banks with which they 
operate
31 and increase the maturity of bank debt. Both small and large firms reduce their 
overdraft rate, though the effect is significant for SMEs only. After the deal, the significant 
increase in debt maturity helps SMEs attain a maturity composition that allows them to 
engage in long term investments and to reduce the tensions on bank credit lines.  
                                                                 
30   Moreover, controlling for SIZE in the leverage regression for SMEs, no significant difference among venture backed 
and  non venture backed  firms  emerges,  whereas  the  contraction  in  leverage  for  larger  firms  becomes  much  more 
significant.   
31   The regression presented in Table 8 also includes the log of sales as a measure of SIZE (the sign of this variable is 
positive and significant).     32 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis of venture capital financing in Italy indicates that this form of finance 
satisfies a variety of needs. The empirical evidence has shown that small firms and those 
with more severe asymmetric information problems are more likely to find the support of the 
venture capitalist, thereby confirming the evidence based on the experience of the United 
States that venture capital is able to reduce significantly financial constraints for smaller 
firms. 
Our results also rationalize the high frequency with which larger firms resort to the 
venture capitalist; in this case, results of both the ex ante and the ex post analysis indicate 
that larger firms demand venture capital services in order to re balance a financial structure 
that is too far tilted towards debt rather than equity. For small firms venture capital financing 
is followed by an increase in the maturity of debt. 
We also find indirect support for the theories that stress the advisory role of the venture 
capitalist, as venture capital financing appears to be more frequent after periods of higher 
than average growth and investment. In particular, the innovation first hypothesis rather than 
the venture capital first hypothesis seems to be accepted: venture capital follows a period of 
growth, but after the deal no significant difference in the performance of venture backed vis 
à vis non venture backed companies emerges.  
Finally, a novel result is that venture capital finance is also directed at firms with weak 
relationships with the banks, as approximated by the number of bank relationships. This 
result  needs  to  be  analyzed  further  in  future  research,  but  indicates  that  venture  capital 
contracts can have a role to play when the relationship between the bank and the firm is 
weak. In this case, the information set available to the bank and the amount of collateral each 
bank can seize in case of default may be limited. Moreover, the amount of bank credit is 
probably  near  its  limit  and  firms  need  to  resort  to  venture  capital,  a  contract  whose 
characteristics reduce the amount of guarantees needed to access external finance. 
 Tables  
Table 1 
Private equity and venture capital 
(aggregate data) 
 
Italy  European Union 
(1)  United States  
 
1998  2000  2003  1998  2000  2003  1998  2000  2003 
Investment:                   
Euro millions  944   2,968   3,034   14,077   33,564   28,689   19,141   115,086   16,301  
‰ of GDP   0.9  2.5  2.3  1.8  3.9  3.1  2.5  10.8  1.7 
Investment share in 
 High Tech sectors %   11.0    23.0    7.0   26.7   41.8   23.4   69.2   69.3   78.3  
Investment share in Seed 
and Start up Stages %   12.0    18.2    1.9   11.0   19.1   7.0   34.1   27.5   20.2  
Investment share in Seed, 
Start Up and Expansion 
Stages % 
 43.3    51.0    21.2   40.4   55.8   27.8   84.6   84.8   74.7  
Divestments through the 
Stock market (as a % of 
investments in the year) 
3.2  2.6  1.4  7.1  2.9  5.5  23.7  30.5  10.8 
New funds raised (Euro 
millions)  1,051  2,925  1,937  19,690  45,653  26,189  26,460  114,551  9,535 
Share of new funds raised 
from pension funds %   6.9  4.0  10.0  24.4  22.9  18.3  60.1  40.1  42.3
(2) 
 
Sources: National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) for the United States; European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA) and AIFI for Europe; AIFI for Italy. 
(1)  EU15 (data for Luxembourg are not available). – (2) 2002. Table 2 
 
The sample of venture capital and private equity deals in Italy 
 
Investments granted to non financial firms. For the period 1989 1996 data on the deals were collected by means of a 
questionnaire sent in 1999 to the main Italian venture capital firms. For the subsequent period information was provided by 
the Italian venture capital association (AIFI). We classify a deal as a “first round” deal when on the basis of available 
information it appears to be the first time the firm receives such financing. 
 
 
Total number of deals  
Year of the deal  
  Of which: first round 
deals  
     
1989  5  5 
1990  4  4 
1991  6  6 
1992  8  6 
1993  14  11 
1994  20  17 
1995  18  16 
1996  23  18 
1997  93  91 
1998  91  73 
1999  59  43 
Total  341  290 
 
 Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
In Panel A, the summary statistics refer to the control sample of small and medium enterprises (SMEs; defined as those with 
less than 20 million euro of total assets). In Panel B data refer to SMEs that received funds from a venture capitalist. In Panel C, 
they refer to the control sample of large enterprises (defined as those with at least 20 million of total assets). In Panel D data 
refer to large firms that were financed by a venture capitalist. Data in Panels A and C are averages over 1988 1999; data in 
Panels B and D refer to the year before the venture capital deal. Leverage is the ratio of debt over debt and equity (at book 
value). ROE is profit over the book value of equity. Intangibles is the ratio of intangible assets over intangible and fixed assets. 
Coverage is EBITDA over interest expense. Growth is the difference between each firm’s sales growth and that of its own 
industry. CAPEX is the rate of change of fixed assets. The number of banks refers to those from which each firm draws credit. 
Overdraft is a dummy equal to 1 if the ratio of credit drawn over credit granted is at least equal to 110 per cent; this ratio is 
calculated taking into account only short term loans. The Herfindahl concentration index and the share of the first bank are 
calculated over the credit drawn by each firm. RISK is the standard deviation of the distribution of ROE for all the companies in 
the same industry. A * indicates that a test of the equality of means between the control sample and the VB sample is rejected 
(at least at 5 per cent). 
 
Variable  Number of 
Obs. 




Panel A: Control sample – SMEs  
Sales (€ mill)  120,414  5.3  8.6  24.4  0.6  26.1 
Total assets (€ mill)  121,602  3.8  6.5  20.6  0.6  19.7 
Number of employees   99,939  29.0  49.6  101.2  4.0  160.0 
Age (years)   98,095  15.0  18.0  13.6  3.9  43.9 
High tech sectors (0 1)  121,055  0  0.03  0.17  0.0  0.0 
Leverage 
 
117,601  53.7  48.0  32.4  0.0  93.5 
Roe   115,326  5.7  3.8  39.6   43.1  46.6 
Intangibles   120,643  4.7  15.3  22.4  0.0  68.0 
Coverage   118,175  2.4  8.1  23.4   1.5  34.2 
Growth   102,331   1.5  2.3  35.1   39.4  52.6 
Capex   95,017  0.4  16.7  63.6   33.3  115.8 
Value added x employee (€ mill)  99,939  3.9  4.9  8.2  1.2  11.5 
Number of banks  103,038  5.0  5.6  4.1  0.0  13.0 
Overdraft  (0 1)  96,410  0  0.04  0.2  0  0 
Share of the first bank   96,649  49.6  55.3  26.8  20.0  100.0 
Herfindahl index   89,026  35.2  44.5  28.7  12.3  100.0 
Credit drawn/credit granted  90,355  30.0  39.9  39.4  0.0  112.7 
Long term loans/Total loans   121,453  4.4  12.1  17.0  0.0  48.0 
Risk  121,598  39.2  39.3  6.5  29.4  52.6 
Panel B: Venture-backed SMEs  
Sales (€ mill)  210  6.5  15.0*  20.8  0.0  53.4 
Total assets (€ mill)  253  7.0  14.3*  28.5  0.1  60.4 
Number of employees  137  74.0  123.5*  133.8  15.0  451.0 
Age (years)  253  6.0  11.4*  15.4  0.0  39.0 
High tech sectors  (0 1)  252  0  0.1*  0.3  0  1 
Leverage 
 
245  42.1  38.6*  32.5  0.0  86.2 
Roe 
 
242  1.2   7.0*  46.6   81.8  29.0 
Intangibles   249  13.9  29.9*  33.4  0.1  100.0 
Coverage   205  2.3  7.0  21.4   7.9  39.9 
Growth  148  2.1  12.5*  52.1   29.0  88.3 
Capex  160  3.4  27.0  69.3   17.4  147.2 
Value added x employee (€ mill)  137  4.4  5.5  4.4  1.8  14.3 
Number of banks  192  5.0  5.9  5.9  0.0  16.0 
Overdraft  (0 1)  124  0  0.04  0.2  0  0 
Share of the first bank   124  41.0  46.6*  24.4  17.4  100.0 
Herfindahl index   121  27.4  35.7*  26.6  11.1  100.0 
Credit drawn/credit granted  117  34.5  41.0  37.3  0.0  110.9 
Long term loans/Total loans   249  5.0  15.1*  20.9  0.0  59.8 




Variable  Number of 
Obs. 




Panel C: Control sample – Large firms  
Sales (€ mill)  8,929  45.5  117.7  568.7  5.1  341.3 
Total assets (€ mill)  9,023  48.1  124.3  484.5  18.1  370.9 
Number of employees  8,601  227.0  555.8  3013.8  19.0  1600.0 
Age (years)  8,442  16.9  24.0  22.2  2.9  74.0 
High tech sectors  (0 1)   8,992  0  0.06  0.2  0  1 
Leverage 
 
8,712  57.1  52.0  29.3  0.0  93.4 
Roe 
 
8,497  4.0   1.1  44.0   66.5  40.4 
Intangibles   8,952  4.9  16.0  23.7  0.0  74.2 
Coverage   8,753  2.2  8.0  24.2   1.8  37.1 
Growth  7,822   2.3  0.2  33.4   41.3  45.0 
Capex  7,274  0.5  10.5  47.8   28.4  77.1 
Value added x employee (€ mill)  8,601  4.9  7.6  36.5  0.9  17.7 
Number of banks  6,752  9.0  10.9  8.6  1.0  26.0 
Overdraft  (0 1)  6,356  0  0.04  0.2  0  0 
Share of the first bank   6,401  45.0  52.5  29.0  15.7  100.0 
Herfindahl index   5,968  30.4  41.6  31.1  8.5  100.0 
Credit drawn/credit granted  5,855  15.4  30.3  35.1  0.0  100.3 
Long term loans/Total loans   9,015  11.2  18.6  21.3  0.0  65.5 
Risk  9,023  39.5  40.0  7.3  30.2  52.6 
Panel D: Venture-backed large firms  
Sales (€ mill)  61  49.1  71.7*  86.5  5.6  188.4 
Total assets (€ mill)  66  50.4  104.6  229.4  20.3  295.6 
Number of employees  59  297.0  411.5*  481.8  49.0  1396.0 
Age (years)  66  9.0  20.0  26.2  0.0  86.0 
High tech sectors  (0 1)  66  0  0.03  0.2  0  0 
Leverage 
 
62  61.3  56.5  25.5  3.7  95.9 
Roe 
 
59  2.0   4.2  45.7   89.3  43.7 
Intangibles   65  13.3  26.9*  30.9  0.4  97.8 
Coverage   64  2.3  3.4*  6.5   2.6  16.4 
Growth  45  4.2  11.9*  31.1   26.5  83.2 
Capex  47   0.05  2.7  25.8   24.0  59.9 
Value added x employee (€ mill)  59  4.5  5.1*  4.7  0.0  16.3 
Number of banks  52  11.0  11.7  7.5  0.0  27.0 
Overdraft  (0 1)  49  0  0.04  0.20  0  0 
Share of the first bank   49  38.5  45.8*  28.1  13.1  100.0 
Herfindahl index   48  22.2  33.3*  27.8  7.7  100.0 
Credit drawn/credit granted  45  18.1  33.8  35.2  0.0  100.4 
Long term loans/Total loans   66  18.1  23.9*  25.6  0.1  86.6 
Risk  66  37.9  38.5*  6.6  31.3  48.7 
 
 Table 4 
Review of theories and empirical evidence on venture capital financing 
 
Empirical predictions 
  References to the literature 





Leland and Pyle (1977) 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) 
Berger and Udell (1998) 
Young and small firms have less visibility than large 
and  mature  ones:  asymmetric  information  problems 
are likely to be more severe for them. In the absence of 
an adequate amount of collateral the debt contract is 
unlikely to induce effort by the entrepreneur. 
Smaller  and  younger  companies  are  more  likely  to 
receive VC finance. Also firms with low collateral are 
more  likely  to  be  venture backed.    Asymmetric 
information problems are likely to be more severe for 
firms operating in high tech sectors or with high R&D 
expenses, that are more difficult to evaluate. 
 
The  venture  capitalist’s  involvement  in  the  firm 
implies a certification effect. Information asymmetries 
are likely to be reduced. If this is the case, the likely 
consequence is an increase in access to outside finance 
(both debt and equity) after the deal. If the increase in 
debt prevails, leverage should increase. With respect to 
firm  performance,  profits  should  increase  to 
remunerate the VC.  
 
Banks and venture 
capitalists 
 
Ueda’s  (2004)  model  is  one  of  asymmetric 
information.  It  specifically  discusses  the  trade offs 
between bank financing and venture capital financing. 
Risk of expropriation by an insider venture capitalist 
has  to  be  weighted  with  the  lack  of  monitoring  by 
uninformed banks. 
In  this  framework  it  is  likely  that  the  quality  of 
information and the amount of collateral available to 
banks are inversely related to the number of banking 
relationships the firm has. VC finance more likely for 
firms with multiple lending. 
Profits should increase to compensate the entrepreneur 
of the risk of expropriation by the venture capitalist.  
 
 
VC as consultant 
Hellman and Puri (2000); Casamatta (2003); Kortum 
and Lerner (1998); Hirukawa and Ueda (2003) 
The  venture  capitalist  participates  actively  in  the 
management  of  the  firm.  In  particular,  his/her 
experience  helps  to  bring  firms  with  new  ideas 
(especially  young  ones  lacking  experience)  to  the 
market and to expand their commercial web.   
The  VC  deal  is  more  likely  when  the  firm  (or  the 
entrepreneur)  is  young,  operates  in  innovative 
industries with high R&D expenses, and after a period 
of higher than average growth.  
If  the  participation  of  the  venture  capitalist  spurs 
innovation (venture capital first hypothesis) we expect 
an increase in growth and in intangible assets after the 
deal.  If  VC  finance  follows  a  period  of  higher  than 
average  growth  (innovation  first  hypothesis),  we  do 
not expect any significant difference in performance 
measures w.r.t non VB firms.   
Re balancing the financial 
structure  
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) 
Bergemann and Hege (1998) 
Venture  capitalists  help  firms  to  re balance  their 
financial  structure  both  in  terms  of  the  composition 
between  debt  and  equity  and  in  terms  of  their  debt 
maturity.  
VC  financing  more  likely  for  high debt/high 
growth/high investment firms. The probability should 
also be higher for firms with a relatively higher share 
of short term debt that does not allow the financing of 
long term investment. 
 
De leveraging/lengthening  of  debt  maturity.  No 
particular predictions for firm performance. Table 5 
 
Determinants of Venture Capital Financing  
 
Columns (a), (b) and (c) report the results of estimating a probit model on the probability of being financed by a venture 
capitalist. The marginal effects are presented. The dependent variable is 0 if the company is not financed, and 1 in the year of 
the deal (firms are dropped from the sample after the first VC deal). The control variables are lagged one year. In columns (a) 
and (c) the control sample is chosen randomly from the CB database among firms of similar size and industry to those that are 
venture backed. In column (b) the control sample is the whole CB sample of non financial firms that are not venture capital 
backed. In column (d) results of a Cox proportional hazard model estimated using the random control sample are reported. In 
this model the dependent variable is the time span between one operation and the other; the event (failure) occurs in the year 
the firm is financed by the venture capitalist. A multiple failure model is estimated to take into account that each firm can be 
financed more than once.  
Age is the age of the firm (in logarithm). Size is the log of total firm sales. High tech is a dummy equal to 1 for companies in 
high tech sectors. ROE is profit over equity. Leverage is debt over debt plus equity. Intangibles is defined as the ratio of 
intangible assets over the sum of intangible and fixed assets. CAPEX is the rate of change of fixed assets. BANKS is the (log 
of the) number of banks from which each firm draws credit. Overdraft is a dummy equal to 1 if the ratio of credit drawn over 
credit granted is at least equal to 110 per cent; this ratio is calculated taking into account only short term loans. RISK is the 
standard deviation of the distribution of ROE for all the companies in the same industry. In the estimation we control also for 
industry  and  calendar  effects  (results  not  reported).  Estimates  are  robust  to  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  and  for 
clustering of the error term. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * 
between 5 and 10 per cent.  Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) in columns (a) (c) are multiplied by 1,000. 
 
                   
Variable  
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
         
Age    0.856  ***   0.208  ***   0.377  ***   0.890  *** 
  (0.106)    (0.025)    (0.125)    (0.162)   
Size    1.106  ***   0.235  ***  0.529     0.768  *** 
  (0.167)    (0.034)    (0.797)    (0.110)   
Size 2   0.068  ***  0.014  ***   0.011    0.050  *** 
  (0.011)    (0.002)    (0.039)    (0.006)   
Intangibles   0.011  ***  0.002  ***  0.012  ***  0.010  *** 
  (0.003)    (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
Leverage   0.003  *   0.001  *   0.003     0.003   
  (0.002)    (0.000)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
ROE   0.001     0.0004     0.0005     0.00002  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.0003)    (0.0014)    (0.00001)   
High tech  1.169  *  0.392  **   0.696     0.346   
  (0.887)    (0.252)    (0.843)    (0.627)   
Capex          0.00001  *     
          (0.000009)       
Risk          0.0190  *     
          (0.0108)       
Banks          0.472  ***     
          (0.160)       
Overdraft          1.506  **     
          (1.030)       
                 
                 
                 
Number of observations  
(For column d: Number of t spans)  
101,433     416,259     66,768    15,932   
Number of VC deals  217     217     125       
Pseudo R
2  0.1600    0.1381    0.1379       
Observed probability   0.00214    0.00052    0.00187       





Age is the age of the firm (in logarithm). Size is the log of total firm sales. Intangibles is the ratio of intangible assets over intangible and fixed assets. Leverage is the ratio of debt over debt and equity (at book 
value). ROE is profit over the book value of equity. High tech is a dummy equal to 1 for companies in high tech sectors. Growth is the difference between each firm’s sales growth and that of its own industry. 
Capex is the rate of change of fixed assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the distribution of ROE for all the companies in the same industry. Banks is the (log of the) number of banks from which each firm 
draws credit. Overdraft is a dummy equal to 1 if the ratio of credit drawn over credit granted is at least equal to 110 per cent; this ratio is calculated taking into account only short term loans. A * indicates that 
the correlation coefficient is significant (at least at the 5 per cent level). 
 
Variable  Age  Size  Intangibles  Leverage  ROE  High tech  Growth  Capex  Risk  Banks  Overdraft 
Age  1.000                     
Size  0.1434*  1.000                   
Intangibles   0.1885*   0.0259*  1.000                 
Leverage   0.0223*   0.001  0.0189*  1.000               
ROE   0.0224*  0.0934*   0.0590*   0.1695*  1.000             
High tech   0.0176*  0.0389*  0.0709*   0.0054*  0.0022   1.000           
Growth   0.0074*  0.0137*  0.0148*   0.0001   0.0001  0.0059*  1.000         
Capex   0.0100*  0.001   0.001  0.001   0.0030   0.001  0.0294*  1.000       
Risk   0.0880*   0.0232*  0.1817*   0.0006   0.0426*  0.1494*  0.0091*  0.0046*  1.000     
Banks  0.1493*  0.3699*   0.1263*  0.0895*   0.0034*   0.0072*   0.0051*   0.0034*   0.1925*  1.000   
Overdraft   0.0367*   0.0900*  0.0394*  0.0405*   0.0684*   0.0036*  0.0047*  0.0070*  0.0456*   0.0908*  1.000 
                       
  
Table 7 
Determinants of venture capital financing  
 (differences between small and large firms) 
Probit regression results for the probability of venture capital finance (marginal effects). The dependent variable is 0 if the company is not financed, and 1 in the year of the deal (firms are dropped from the sample 
after the first VC deal). The regressors are lagged one year. The control sample is chosen randomly from the CB database among firms of similar size and industry as those that are venture backed. Small and 
medium firms (SMEs) have less than 20 million euro in total assets. Large firms have assets of at least 20 million euros. Size is the log of firm sales. High tech is a dummy equal to 1 for companies in high tech 
sectors. ROE is profit over equity. Leverage is debt over debt plus equity. Intangibles is the ratio of intangible assets over the sum of intangibles and fixed assets. Growth is the difference between a firm’s sales 
rate of growth and that of its industry. CAPEX is the rate of change of fixed assets. BANKS is the (log of the) number of banks that grant credit to each firm. Risk is the cross sectional standard deviation of the 
ROE of companies in the same industry. The dummy Overdraft is 1 if credit drawn over credit granted is at least equal to 110 per cent. In the estimation we control also for industry and calendar effects (results 
not reported). Estimates are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and for clustering of the error term. *** indicates significance level of 1 % or less; ** between 1 and 5 %; * between 5 and 10 %. 
Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 1,000. 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Variables 
SME  Dummy 
 large  SME  Dummy 
 large  SME  Dummy 
 large  SME  Dummy 
 large  SME  Dummy 
 large 
                                         
Age   0.8458  ***  0.3265  *   0.3884  ***  0.3059      0.6584  ***  0.3221      0.8063  ***  0.3498  *   0.3598  ***  0.0348   
  (0.107)    (0.200)    (0.135)    (0.258)    (0.145)    (0.280)    (0.104)    (0.200)    (0.095)    (0.177)   
Size   1.1243  ***  0.3013  *   1.8233  ***  0.5646  ***   1.2898  ***  0.3907  *   1.0940  ***  0.6922  ***   0.4441     0.5195  *** 
  (0.184)    (0.179)    (0.309)    (0.222)    (0.232)    (0.225)    (0.176)    (0.234)    (0.321)    (0.171)   
Size
2  0.0703  ***   0.0362  ***  0.1170  ***   0.0633  ***  0.0857  ***   0.0450  ***  0.0685  ***   0.0544  ***  0.0410  **   0.0493  *** 
  (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.019)    (0.017)    (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.013)    (0.016)    (0.018)    (0.014)   
Intangibles  0.0093  ***  0.0026     0.0110  ***  0.0051     0.0149  ***  0.0006     0.0078  ***  0.0064     0.0082  ***  0.0025   
  (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.003)    (0.007)    (0.004)    (0.008)    (0.002)    (0.005)    (0.002)    (0.004)   
Leverage   0.0044  **  0.0106  **   0.0035     0.0071      0.0052  **  0.0083      0.0038  **  0.0098  **   0.0031  *  0.0053   
  (0.002)    (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.006)    (0.003)    (0.006)    (0.002)    (0.005)    (0.002)    (0.004)   
ROE   0.0016    0.0045      0.0021     0.0028      0.0021     0.0032      0.0012     0.0045      0.0008    0.0016   
  (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.003)   
High tech  1.2802  **      2.6539  **      1.8231  **      0.8641  *      0.6860       
  (0.925)        (2.127)        (1.378)        (0.729)        (0.756)       
Growth          0.0032  *  0.0063  **                         
          (0.002)    (0.003)                           
Capex                  0.0021  **   0.0040                    
                  (0.001)    (0.003)                   
Risk                          0.0350  **   0.0564  ***         
                          (0.009)    (0.019)           
Banks                                  0.3754  ***   0.1274   
                                  (0.122)    (0.180)   
Overdraft                                  1.1563  **   0.2299   
                                  (0.845)    (0.277)   
                                         
N. of observations  101,433  83,274  76,304  101,431  81,113 
N. of  VC deals  170  47  116  31  125  33  170  47  101  37 
Pseudo R
2  0.1697  0.1244  0.1275  0.1748  0.1611 
Observed probability  0.00214  0.00177  0.00207  0.00214  0.00170 
 Table 8 
Effects of venture capital financing 
For each variable listed, we estimated the following specification: yi,t = a + b1VC0 + b2VC13+b3VC4T+ui+dt+ei,t 
where VC0 is a dummy equal to 1 in every first year of the deal; VC13 takes the value of 1 in the three subsequent years; VC4T is 1 from the fourth year onwards. ui is a firm specific effect, dt is a calendar year 
specific effect, eit is a random error with zero mean. The specification is estimated with a fixed effect method by using each company as control for itself after the deal; in this way we are able to control for firm 
specific characteristics which are time invariant but correlated to VC effects, such as managerial behaviour, etc. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity adjusted with the White correction and are 
reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 % or less; ** between 1 and 5 %; * between 5 and 10 %. The control sample is chosen randomly from the CB database among firms of 
similar size and industry as those that are venture backed. Small and medium firms (SMEs) are defined as those with less than 20 million euro of total assets. Large firms are those with at least 20 million euro in 
total assets. ROE is profit over the book value of equity. ROS is EBITDA over total sales. CAPEX is the rate of change of fixed assets. Leverage is the book value of debt over the book value of debt and equity. 
Intangibles is defined as the ratio of intangible assets over the sum of intangibles and fixed assets. Growth is the difference between a firm’s sales rate of growth and that of the industry in which the firm operates. 
Number of banks is calculated for banks that grant credit to each firm. LTLO is the ratio between long term and total bank loans. CDCG is the ratio of credit drawn over credit granted and is calculated taking into 
account only short term loans. The Herfindahl concentration index is calculated over the credit drawn by each firm. The column F test reports the test on the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of all the ex 
post dummies is equal to zero. *** indicates that the hypothesis is rejected at a significance level of 1 % or less; ** between 1 and 5 %; * between 5 and 10%.  




Year 0   
Years 
1 3 
  Years >3    F test   
Number 
of obs. 






  F test   
ROE  151,424   1.211      8.223  **   4.037     3.20  **  11,385   1.748     7.991  *    2.253     2.36  * 
    (4.292)    (3.855)    (4.203)          (5.930)    (4.353)    (4.948)       
ROS  156,920  0.558     0.507     2.990    0.92    11,815  0.818    2.013     3.781    1.82   
    (2.831)    (2.314)    (2.184)          (2.436)    (1.979)    (2.751)       
Value added x employee (log)  124,076  0.016    0.004    0.013    0.07    10,586  0.022    0.139  *  0.113    1.83   
    (0.042)    (0.034)    (0.043)          (0.083)    (0.073)    (0.080)       
Capex  128,099   16.035  ***   6.773  *   9.197  **   5.16  ***  9,965                    7.131      1.524      2.838     0.66   
    (6.266)    (4.015)    (4.318)          (6.054)    (4.047)    (4.929)       
Fixed assets x employee  124,835   0.022    3.991  **  4.711  **  3.32  **  10,288   0.758     1.191     0.001    0.14   
    (1.931)    (1.697)    (2.043)          (3.075)    (2.771)    (2.910)       
Total assets (log)  159,236   0.325  ***  0.562  ***  0.356  ***  17.96  ***  12,099   0.023     0.099    0.051     0.69   
    (0.096)    (0.085)    (0.091)          (0.134)    (0.071)    (0.082)       
Intangibles   157,866   1.374      2.512  *   6.154  ***  9.35  ***  11,995   4.592  **  3.225  *   1.882     2.23  * 
    (1.651)    (1.424)    (1.543)          (2.027)    (1.767)    (2.012)       
Growth   128,439    6.424      11.911      23.036  ***  5.07  ***  9,870   7.522      6.378      8.344  *  2.17  * 
    (7.927)    (7.614)    (7.806)          (7.178)    (4.291)    (4.986)       
D Sales  128,772   7.006     11.829     21.821  ***  4.33  ***  9,881  8.314     5.850     8.718  *  2.29  * 
    (7.939)    (7.619)    (7.795)          (7.183)    (4.338)    (5.009)       
D Assets  119,425  0.208     2.597     2.683    1.40    9,421  6.161  *  0.746     0.553    1.59   
    (1.965)    (1.627)    (1.840)          (3.213)    (2.221)    (2.356)       
D employees  104,769   2.580     10.775     16.233  **  1.57    9,683  28.010    1.567    14.615    0.89   
    (10.235)    (7.398)    (8.293)          (18.906)    (8.999)    (22.870)        
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  F test   
Number 
of obs. 






  F test   
Leverage  155,430    1.060    5.056  ***  3.141  *   8.20  ***  11,803    6.166  **   3.489     5.182  *  1.70   
    (1.696)    (1.473)    (1.792)          (2.929)    (2.344)    (2.862)       
Debt/sales  151,752   0.598    1.996     0.721    1.89    10,600   1.850     3.967  *   0.464    1.45   
    (1.760)    (1.513)    (1.737)          (3.492)    (2.435)    (2.930)       
LTLO  155,338   4.312  ***  4.866  ***  3.069  **  6.58  ***  11,800   0.185     0.326     2.018     0.47   
    (1.389)    (1.132)    (1.333)          (2.749)    (2.427)    (2.544)       
CDCG (1)  80,763   5.161     6.583  **   2.556    1.77    4,895  2.896     2.101     5.807    0.70   
    (3.689)    (3.128)    (3.581)          (6.510)    (4.604)    (5.050)       
Number of Banks (2)  124,653  0.302     0.258     0.459  **  6.35  ***  8,501  0.671    1.480  **  1.391    2.43  ** 
    (0.244)    (0.212)    (0.240)          (0.647)    (0.593)    (0.724)       
Herfindahl  119,772  3.086     2.208     0.230    2.65  **  8,518    0.635      5.219  *   2.652     1.27   
    (2.199)    (1.920)    (2.183)          (3.906)    (3.124)    (3.316)       
 
(1)  Only firms with non negligible values of the credit drawn over credit granted are considered (at least 5 per cent). Data trimmed for extreme values. – (2) The 
regression includes also a measure of size (log of total sales). Only firms with non missing values of credit drawn over credit granted are considered. Data trimmed for 
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